The standard decision theories of Savage and of Anscombe and Aumann both postulate that the domain of consequences is state independent. But this hypothesis makes no sense when, for instance, there is a risk of death or serious injury. The paper considers one possible way of deriving subjective probabilities and utilities in this case also. Moreover, the utilities will be state independent in the sense of giving equal value to any consequence that happens to occur in more than one state dependent consequence domain. The key is to consider decision trees having "hypothetical" probabilities attached to states of nature, and even to allow hypothetical choices of these probabilities.
Introduction: State-Dependent Consequence Domains
The standard decision theories of Savage (1954) and of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) both rely on the assumption that there are "constant acts" yielding the same consequence in all states of the world. More precisely, they postulate that the domain of consequences is state independent. But there are many decision problems where this hypothesis makes no sense -for instance, where there is a risk of death or serious injury. The point was first made by Drèze (1958 Drèze ( , 1961 ) that such problems do not fit well with Savage's (1954) assumption that all consequences are possible in every state of the world.
The inapplicability of standard theory led several authors to investigate state-dependent utilities -see especially Karni (1985 Karni ( , 1987 , Drèze (1987b) , and the works cited therein, together with Jones- Lee (1979) . Obviously, statedependent utility is a generalization of the standard theory. Yet a more satisfactory generalization would reduce to the standard theory with state-independent utility in the special case considered by that theory -namely, when there is a state-independent consequence domain. In particular, the von NeumannMorgenstern utility function (NMUF) should be state-independent in the sense of giving a unique value to any consequence that happens to occur in more than one state-dependent consequence domain. Such a generalization was provided by Fishburn (1970, Section 13 .2) for a special case when there at least two non-indifferent common consequences belonging to each state-dependent consequence domain. This paper sets out to provide a similar generalization for general state-dependent consequence domains.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 begins by reviewing evaluation functions (Wilson, 1968) which are defined on pairs consisting of states of the world and consequences. It shows how they relate to marginal rates of substitution between appropriate probability shifts, and how this relationship implies that an evaluation function is determined up to a unique co-cardinal equivalence class. Next, Section 3 recalls five sufficient conditions for the existence of an evaluation function whose expected value is maximized by the agent's behaviour.
1 To allow subjective probabilities to be disentangled from the evaluation function, Section 4 analyses decision problems with "hypothetical" probabilities attached to states of nature, following the suggestion of Karni, Schmeidler and Vind (1983) . It even allows hypothetical choices of these probabilities, as in Drèze (1961 Drèze ( , 1987 and also Karni (1985) . Finally, Section 5 invokes a weaker form of the standard state independence condition which is appropriate for state dependent consequence domains. It also presents the main theorem guaranteeing the existence of a state-independent NMUF even when the consequence domain depends on the state.
Evaluation Functions
Let S be a fixed finite domain of possible states of the world. This paper considers the implications of allowing state-dependent consequence domains Y s (s ∈ S). Also, in contrast to Karni (1993a, b) , it will not be assumed that consequences in different state-dependent consequence domains are in any way related through "constant valuation acts" or "state invariance".
The Cartesian product space Y S := s∈S Y s has members y S = y s s∈S in the form of mappings from states to consequences. Savage calls these "acts" whereas Anscombe and Aumann refer to "horse lotteries," but I prefer to call them contingent consequence functions (or CCFs 
be the universal domain of state-consequence pairs. This is an obvious generalization of the domain of "prize-state lotteries" considered by Karni (1985) . 
These probabilities specify the marginal distribution λ s ∈ ∆(Y s ) on the appropriate component Y s of the product space Y S . Throughout this paper it will be assumed that there is a (complete and transitive) preference ordering ∼ on ∆(Y S ). Given this ordering, define an evaluation function (Wilson, 1968; Myerson, 1979) as a real-valued mapping w(s, y) on the domain Y S with the property that the preference ordering ∼ is represented by the expected total evaluation defined for all λ S ∈ ∆(Y S ) by
Note that evaluation functions differ from state-dependent utility functions because the latter are separate from subjective probabilities, whereas the former combine utility functions with subjective probabilities. Note too how (3) implies that only the marginal probabilities λ s (y) (s ∈ S, y ∈ Y ) are relevant to the expected evaluation.
Say that two evaluation functions w(s, y) andw(s, y) are co-cardinally equivalent if and only if there exist real constants ρ > 0, independent of s, and δ
In this case the alternative expected evaluation satisfies 
Similarly, if preferences are represented by (5). Hence, the common ratio , s , a, b, c, d there must exist some constant ρ > 0 such that
This implies (4), sow(s, y) and w(s, y) must be co-cardinally equivalent functions on the domain Y S .
Five Sufficient Conditions
Anscombe and Aumann postulated that the expected utility hypothesis was satisfied for lotteries with objective probabiliities. When applied to lotteries in ∆(Y S ), this hypothesis implies and implied by the following three conditions:
(O) Ordering. There exists a (compete and transitive) preference ordering ∼ on ∆(Y S ).
S , the two sets
As shown by Jensen (1967) and Fishburn (1970) , the expected utility hypothesis is still implied when conditions (I*) and (C*) are replaced by the following two weaker conditions, both of which apply for each λ
As already discussed, one implication of (3) is the following condition:
This condition owes its name to the fact that there is indifference between: (i) the compound lottery in which a roulette lottery λ S determines the random CCF y S before the horse lottery that resolves which state s ∈ S and which ultimate consequence y s occur; and (ii) the reversed compound lottery in which the horse lottery is resolved first, and its outcome s ∈ S determines which marginal roulette lottery λ s generates the ultimate consequence y.
In particular, suppose that µ S = s∈E λ s is the product lottery defined, for all y 
which represents the contingent preference ordering
So the following version of the usual sure thing principle must hold:
The following preliminary Lemma 1 shows that the four conditions (O), (I*), (RO) and (STP) are not logically independent. In fact, as Raiffa (1961) implicitly suggests in his discussion of the Ellsberg paradox, condition (STP) is an implication of the three conditions (O), (I*) and (RO) -see also Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991) .
Lemma 1. Suppose that the three axioms (O), (I*), and (RO) are satisfied on ∆(Y S ). Then so is (STP).
Proof: Consider any event E ⊂ S and also any lotteries λ
, axioms (I*) and (RO) respectively imply that
But then transitivity of ∼ and axiom (I*) imply that (λ 
Lemma 2. Under the five conditions (O), (I), (C), (RO) and (STP), there exists a unique co-cardinal equivalence class of evaluation functions w(s, y) such that the expected sum U S (λ S ) defined by (3) represents the corresponding preference ordering ∼ on ∆(Y S ).
Proof: Because the ordering ∼ satisfies conditions (O), (I) and (C), a standard result of (objectively) expected utility theory shows that ∼ can be represented by a unique normalized expected utility function U S : ∆(Y S ) → IR which satisfies the equations
as well as the mixture preservation property (MP) requiring that, whenever
Then for each state s ∈ S and lottery λ ∈ ∆(Y s ), define
Let m be the number of elements in the finite set S. By an argument similar to that used by Fishburn (1970) 
But U S (λ S ) = 0 by (9), so (11) and (13) imply that
Finally, for each y ∈ Y s , let 1 y ∈ ∆(Y s ) denote the degenerate lottery attaching probability 1 to the particular consequence y. Then define w(s, y) := u s (1 y ) for each s ∈ S and y ∈ Y s . By (11), because U S satisfies (10), one has
whenever λ s , µ s ∈ ∆(Y s ) and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Hence, u s also satisfies an appropriate version of (MP) and so, because λ s ≡ y∈Ys λ s (y) 1 y , it follows that u s (λ s ) ≡ y∈Ys λ s (y) w(s, y). Because of (14), U S (λ S ) is given by (3). The fact that there is a unique co-cardinal equivalence class of the functions w(s, y) follows easily from the discussion at the end of Section 2.
Chosen Probabilities and State-Dependent Utilities
An extreme case of state-dependent consequence domains occurs if Y s and Y s are disjoint whenever s = s . In this case, there is no hope of inferring subjective probabilities from behaviour. To see why, suppose that the agent's behaviour is observed to maximize the subjective expected utility (SEU) function
where p s > 0 for all s ∈ S. Then the same behaviour will also maximize the equivalent SEU function
for any positive subjective probabilitiesp s satisfying s∈Sp s = 1, provided thatṽ(y) = p s v(y s )/p s for all y ∈ Y s . Without further information, there is no way of disentangling subjective probabilities from utilities. Following a suggestion of Karni, Schmeidler and Vind (1983) , such additional information could be inferred from hypothetical behaviour when probabilities p s (s ∈ S) happen to be specified. The idea is that, though the agent does not know the true probabilities of the different states of the world, nevertheless it should be possible for coherent decisions to emerge if the agent happened to discover what the true probabilities are. In particular, if the true probabilities happen to coincide with the agent's subjective probabilities, the agent's behaviour should be the same whether or not these true probabilities are known.
3
A somewhat extreme version of this assumption will be used here. Following Karni (1985, Section 1.6), Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (1990) , and also Karni and Schmeidler (1991) , it will be assumed that the decision-maker can handle problems involving not only hypothetical probabilities, but also hypothetical choices of probabilities. As discussed by Karni and Mongin (1997) , these hypothetical choices involve what they call "state-outcome lotteries". Consider, for instance, problems where the states of nature are indeed natural disasters, weather events, etc. It will be assumed that the decision-maker can rank prospects of the following general kind: A probability of 2% each year of a major earthquake? Or 1% each year of a devastating hundred-year flood? Or 4% each year of a serious forest fire set off by lightning? More specifically, the assumption is that the decision-maker can resolve such issues within a coherent framework of decision analysis. Certainly, if the SEU hypothesis holds, it can be applied to decide such issues. Drèze's (1961 Drèze's ( , 1987 theory of "moral hazard" is based on a somewhat related idea. But Drèze assumes that the agent can influence the choice of state, as opposed to the choice of probabilities of different states.
For this reason, it will be assumed that there exists an additional preference ordering ∼S on the whole extended lottery domain ∆(Y S ), where Y S is defined by (1) 
-i.e., it is the universal state-consequence domain of pairs (s, y). Thus, ∼S satisfies condition (O). Furthermore, assume that ∼S satisfies the obvious counterparts of conditions (I) and (C) for the domain ∆(Y S ).
4 Arguing as in the orthodox theory of (objectively) expected utility, there must exist a unique cardinal equivalence class of extended NMUFs v S on the domain Y S whose expected values all represent the ordering ∼S on ∆(Y S ). Because the function v S (s, y) has both the state s ∈ S and the consequence y ∈ Y s as arguments, for each fixed s ∈ S the NMUF v S (s, ·) is a state-dependent utility function on the domain Y s .
Note next that when any state s ∈ S is certain, and assuming that everything relevant to each decision is included within each consequence y ∈ Y s , the spaces Y s and Y Ss := {s} × Y s are effectively equivalent consequence domains. Thus, each ∆(Y s ) is effectively the same space as the set 
be the set of states in which y occurs. Then the CCF y S ∈ Y S is subjectively equivalent to the lottery λ ∈ ∆(Ŷ ) with the objective probability of each consequence y ∈Ŷ given by λ(y) = s∈E(y S ,y) q s .
Because of (16) 
This formula now enables ratios of subjective probabilities to be inferred uniquely in an obvious way from marginal rates of substitution (MRSs) between shifts in objective probability, expressed in the form of ratios of utility differences. The first term of the product is the MRS between changes in the probabilities of consequences in two different states of the kind considered in (6). The second term is a four-way ratio of utility differences that equals the MRS between shifts in probability from (s ,ỹ s ) to (s , y s ) and shifts in probability from (s,ỹ s ) to (s, y s ). One particular advantage of Anscombe and Aumann's approach is that subjective probabilities can be interpreted in this way. No interpretation quite as simple emerges from Savage's version of the theory.
To summarize the results of the above discussion:
Lemma 3. Suppose that: 
conditions (O), (I), and (C) apply to the ordering ∼S on the domain ∆(Y S );

conditions (O), (I), (C), (RO) and (STP) apply to the ordering
U S (λ S ) ≡ s∈S q s ys∈Ys λ s (y s ) v S (s, y s )(18)
State-Independent Utilities
Previous writers have expressed a specific interest in state-dependent preferences and utilities. There was no attempt to define the space of consequences broadly enough so that the preference between any pair of (risky) consequences would be independent of the state in which they both occur. This flies in the face of the traditional approach to decision theory, in which actions are valued entirely by their consequences. It also contradicts the closely related "consequentialist" approach, which recommends that behaviour all decision trees should effectively reveal a consequence choice function (Hammond, 1988) . The motivation which Karni, Schmeidler and Vind (1983) in particular offer for state-dependent preferences is to treat "a class of insurance problems involving irreplaceable objects such as life, health and heirlooms," and also "criminal activity where one possible outcome is loss of freedom" (p. 1021). These writers infer that " [t] here are circumstances . . . in which the evaluation of the consequences is not independent of the prevailing state of nature". No doubt this is true if one insists on considering only (narrow) economic consequences such as commodity bundles or purchasing power. But if life, health, heirlooms, and freedom are really relevant to good decisions, I would argue that they should be included in the descriptions of consequences.
In fact, no attention has been paid so far to the evident fact that some consequences can arise in more than one state of the world. Apart from being unrealistic, this also means that the usual theory of subjective expected utility has not really been generalized. Instead of one extreme of identical consequence domains in all states, as in the classical theory, most of the existing literature has merely gone to the other extreme of consequence domains in different states being treated as if they were pairwise disjoint. The main point of this paper is to find sufficient conditions for giving a unique value to each consequence, even if it occurs in a different state of the world.
So there is no good case for requiring the value of a consequence to depend upon the state of the world in which it occurs -as Arrow (1974, pp. 5-6) certainly recognizes, for one. Drèze (1987a, ch. 2) also discusses this point, but prefers a theory of preferences regarding "prizes" (such as "money amounts or commodity bundles") which can be associated with every state, so that conditional preferences on a fixed set of prizes are well defined for every possible event. Drèze (1987a, p. 28 ) is fully aware that this "amounts to redefining consequences as pairs, consisting of a prize and a state".
Actually, what appear to be "state-dependent" preferences for prizes in state-prize pairs are trivially equivalent to state-independent preferences for suitably defined extended consequences. To see this, suppose one regards each state-outcome pair (s, y) in the universal domain Y S defined by (1) 
for all λ S ∈ ∆(Y S ) and all y ∈Ŷ . Thus, φ(λ S )(y) is the total probability of all state-consequence pairs (s, y) in which the particular consequence y occurs. Evidently, for all λ S , µ S ∈ ∆(Y S ) and all α ∈ (0, 1), definition (19) implies that The pre-image correspondence Φ S : ∆(Ŷ ) → → ∆(Y S ) of φ can be defined, for all λ ∈ ∆(Ŷ ), by
Because of Lemma 4, Φ S (λ) is never empty. In this framework, it now seems natural to impose the requirement that, given any pair λ S , µ S ∈ ∆(Y S ) for which the induced consequence lotteries φ(λ S ), φ(µ S ) ∈ ∆(Ŷ ) are the same, the state s in which each state-consequence pair (s, y) ∈ Y S occurs is irrelevant. In particular, this suggests the following:
Thus, for each λ ∈ ∆(Ŷ ), the set Φ S (λ) must be an indifference class for the relation ∼S . So there must exist a "state-independent consequence" preference relation ∼Y on ∆(Ŷ ) defined by
Equivalently, for all pairs λ S , µ S ∈ ∆(Y S ), it must be true that
In the special case of a state-independent consequence domain, when Y s = Y for all s ∈ S, condition (GSI) evidently implies that ∼S reduces to an ordering on ∆(Y ). But condition (GSI) can also hold when the domains Y s depend on the state; they could even be pairwise disjoint.
Lemma 5. Suppose that conditions (O), (I), (C) and (GSI) apply to the ordering ∼S on the domain ∆(Y S ). Then the relation ∼Y on ∆(Ŷ ) defined by (22) satisfies conditions (O), (I), and (C).
Proof: Throughout the following proof, given any three lotteries λ, µ, ν ∈ ∆(Ŷ ), let λ S , µ S , ν S ∈ ∆(Y S ) denote arbitrarily chosen members of Φ S (λ), Φ S (µ) and Φ S (ν) respectively. That is, suppose λ = φ(λ S ), µ = φ(µ S ), and ν = φ(ν S ). Because of (20), whenever 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 it follows that
Condition (O).
Because (GSI) implies that each set Φ S (λ) (λ ∈ ∆(Ŷ )) must be an indifference class for the preference ordering ∼S , definition (22) obviously implies that ∼Y is reflexive, complete, and transitive. So ∼Y is a preference ordering.
Condition (I) . Suppose that 0 < α < 1. Because ∼S satisfies condition (I), it follows from (22) and (23) that
Therefore ∼Y also satisfies condition (I).
Condition (C).
Suppose that λ Y µ and µ Y ν. Then λ S S µ S and also µ S S ν S . Because ∼S satisfies condition (C), it follows that there exist α , α ∈ (0, 1) such that α λ S +(1−α ) ν S S µ S and µ S S α λ S +(1−α ) ν S . Then (20) and (23) together imply that α λ + (1 − α ) ν Y µ, and also that µ Y α λ + (1 − α ) ν. Therefore ∼Y also satisfies condition (C).
Main Theorem. Suppose that: 
conditions (O), (I), (C) and (GSI) apply to the ordering
Proof: By the first hypothesis and Lemma 5, there is an associated ordering ∼Y on ∆(Ŷ ) which satisfies conditions (O), (I), and (C). So the standard results of (objectively) expected utility theory imply that there exists a unique cardinal equivalence class of expected utility functionsÛ : ∆(Ŷ ) → IR which represent ∼Y while satisfying the mixture preservation property (MP) requiring that
whenever λ, µ ∈ ∆(Ŷ ) and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Definev(y) :=Û (1 y ) for all y ∈Ŷ . Thenv is state-independent and belongs to a unique cardinal equivalence class. Because of (MP), condition (GSI) implies that ∼S on ∆(Y S ) must be represented by the expected utility function Because ρ > 0, it follows that ∼ is also represented by the expected value of the NMUF (24).
Finally, the subjective conditional probabilities p s (s ∈ S) are unique because each ratio p s /p s is given by the unique corresponding ratio (17) of utility differences.
